DAY PASS
one (1) linux machine
- cpu
- 1 vCPU
- memory
- 1 GiB
- lease
- 300 s
- fare
- x402
Non-transferable. Non-persistent. Void after 300 seconds.
disposable linux · no accounts
sandbox rents Linux machines by the session. Pick a length, pay once in USDC on Base, run your thing. The lease ends and the machine is gone, files and all. There is no suspend and no resume, so nothing you write outlives the lease.
MIT source · hosted beta at api.throwbox.dev
one (1) linux machine
Non-transferable. Non-persistent. Void after 300 seconds.
Two-node Kata cluster, control 0.1.16, 2026-11-09, n=50. 0.1.22 measured 292 to 354 ms server ready across two runs, so this is a baseline, not a promise. Method and caveats.
the idea
No signup, no dashboard, no key rotation.
The payment is the identity. A retried payment returns the same session instead of billing twice.
one payment → one session
Commands and files are sealed to the guest's key. The API, controller and relay route ciphertext only, and hold no key to any of it.
ciphertext in transit · Kata microVM · boundary tested · escape untested
Three things end the lease: the guest watchdog, the controller deadline, Kubernetes. The pod and its workspace go with it, and nothing is written somewhere that outlives them.
delete is idempotent · no suspend, no resume
the life
The lease is the only thing that can keep it alive. There is no suspend and no resume here: the workspace dies with the lease, and the next session starts empty.
Post a spec and a public key. Get a price for that spec.
POST /v1/sessions → 402
Cold boot, or a warm pool if one is running. Capability and session come back once.
201 · READY
Sealed commands, files under /workspace, one foreground operation at a time. Background processes die when the command returns.
exec · file.put · http
Lease ends, pod deleted, workspace purged. There is nothing to clean up.
DELETE → 200
three handles
Use the CLI or the SDK. Don't hand-roll the envelopes.
sandbox run --json -- python3 app.py
SDK
Typed client, auto-destroyAlways cleans up, even when the command fails.
await client.run({ command, files })
HTTP
Raw routes, sealed bodiesCapability header, envelopes, idempotency keys.
POST api.throwbox.dev/v1/sessions
for your agent
Install, one-shot path, HTTP flow, limits, failure modes. One file.
finally blockoutcome_unknown means402 or a 429 means# tape this to your agent
Read {origin}/llms.txt first.
Hosted API: https://api.throwbox.dev
Use the CLI or @x402s/sdk.
Do not hand-roll the sealed envelopes.
Prefer sandbox run --json.
Destroy in a finally block.
Keep files under 8 MiB.
Never inline secrets in a command.
If the result says outcome_unknown,
the command may have run. Do not
blindly retry a side effect.
curl -s {origin}/llms.txt
on your laptop
Same API, relay and guest as a real deployment.
make up # kind + cilium + images + deploy
make demo-session # pay, create, exec, upload, download
make down
Needs Docker, kind, kubectl, the Cilium CLI, Node 24+ and Go 1.26+. Local clusters use runc, not microVMs. API on http://localhost:8080; GET /healthz is the cheapest check.
npm ci
make verify # typecheck, structure lint, unit + property
make test # adds integration against the guest binary
Most of the system is testable in under a minute. make security-test needs a cluster and runs the packet-level isolation suite.
Hosted beta, one operator, one region, no SLA. Payment is real USDC on Base. One control-plane node and one Postgres primary carry the control plane, so losing that node is an outage and no failover has been measured. Sessions are ephemeral: no suspend, no resume. Isolation is a Kata microVM, tested for the boundary properties in the suite; that is not a hardware root of trust, and no escape has been attempted. What the isolation run proved.
the small print
Every claim here points at a doc or a test. The gaps are listed the same way.
Isolation between sessions is a Kata microVM, and the boundary properties the suite tests were verified on a real Kata cluster at control 0.1.33 and guest 0.1.33: the guest ran its own kernel and could not reach another session, the Kubernetes API, a node, the metadata endpoint, a Service VIP or the internet except through the egress proxy. That is not a hardware root of trust and it is not an escape test: no escape attempt has been made, so nothing here claims the hypervisor survives one. There is no hardware attestation either, and the attestation key ships in the repo, so the client proves which key it is talking to and not what the operator is running. The security review was written by the person who wrote the code, not an independent reviewer, and it is not a penetration test. Checkpoint storage is plaintext, which is why suspend is not offered. If a hostile-tenant guarantee is what you need, this beta does not sell one yet, and the docs say which controls are proven and which are not.
Read the guarantee matrix, the isolation evidence and the threat model before repeating any of this as a security claim.
the rules
You pay per session, we run the machine, and neither of us wants a contract to read.
Use a session for work you have the right to do. Not allowed: attacking or scanning systems you do not own, spam, crypto mining, illegal content, escaping the sandbox, or reaching another session, the cluster network or its metadata service.
Report abuse to [email protected]. That address reaches the operator, because the operator is the whole company.
One payment, one session, in USDC on Base, settled through the Coinbase CDP facilitator. There is no account to top up and no balance to spend later: what you pay covers the session you asked for, and the lease ends when it ends. Free access is by invitation only.
If a session never reaches ready, or we end it because the relay could not recover, the payment is refunded in full to the paying wallet. A session you destroy, or one that simply expires after it was ready, is not refunded: the time was delivered.
Refunds are queued in the payment ledger and sent by a separate worker, so they are not instant. If one cannot be sent automatically it stays queued and an operator resolves it.
Session metadata (tier, limits, timings, state), the paying wallet address, and the payment ledger. Commands, file contents and output stay ciphertext: the API, controller and relay hold no key.
The guest sees whatever you run, and nothing you write is kept: the workspace dies with the lease. Checkpoint storage is plaintext, which is why there is no suspend. This page sets no cookies and runs no analytics.
No SLA and no uptime target. No hardware attestation, so the provider could run a different guest. The boundary is tested for the properties in the suite; no escape has been attempted, and the review is not independent.
One operator, one region, one control-plane node, one Postgres primary. If that node is lost, the control plane is down until it comes back.
Bring a cluster, read the protocol, or point a client at api.throwbox.dev.